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Abstract
Michael Ayers’s Knowing and Seeing: Groundwork for a New Empiricism is a rich and 
detailed development of two ideas. The first is that perception presents reality to 
us directly in a perspicuous way. We thus acquire primary knowledge of the world: 
“knowledge gained by being evidently, self-consciously, in direct cognitive contact 
with the object of the knowledge.” (Ayers 2019, 63) The second idea is that concepts are 
not needed in perception. In this article, the author examines Ayers’s view. The author 
proceeds as follows: In the first section, he identifies the target of Ayers’s attacks, con-
ceptualism. He then describes why many philosophers have felt this conceptualist 
view to be attractive. In the next section, he discusses Ayers’s criticisms of conceptual-
ism in an attempt to disentangle these criticisms from the statement of his positive 
view, which the author discusses in the following section. He ends by describing some 
problems for Ayers’s positive position that are, so he argues, the result of his vehement 
opposition to conceptualism.
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Perception yields knowledge. Within the paradigm of the analysis of knowl-
edge as ‘justified true belief ’, propositions can be said to be known, if they are 
justified, true and believed. Propositions that constitute knowledge thus con-
stitute a sub-class of beliefs.
In the first chapter of his book, that is written jointly with Maria Rosa 
Antognazza, Michael Ayers shows that in the past, philosophers treated our 
knowledge faculty as a different and separate mental faculty from our belief 
faculty. Traditionally, the term knowledge was much narrower in scope than 
what is nowadays called ‘knowledge’. According to the traditional view, we 
have only knowledge of what is immediately and in itself evident.
For Ayers, this is a source of inspiration for his own epistemology. His book 
Knowing and Seeing is woven out of two threads. The first, positive thread is the 
development of his own epistemology, which is markedly different from main-
stream contemporary epistemology. Starting point is a description of the phe-
nomenology of perception. In perception, Ayers claims, we are aware of our 
environment as our environment, and we are at the same time perceptually 
aware of how it is that we are aware of it. Perception is perspicuous. Objects 
are in perception “directly ‘presented’ to the knower, rather than being merely 
represented.” (Ayers 2019, 62) Perception is the foundation for what Ayers 
calls ‘primary knowledge’. The term ‘secondary knowledge’ Ayers reserves for 
knowledge that is not perspicuous, for instance, things we know on the basis 
of inferences to the best explanation.
He distinguishes both kinds of knowledge from belief, although he does 
not follow the tradition in claiming that knowledge and belief do not overlap, 
nor is his view that they are the products of different faculties. On the con-
trary, Ayers maintains that they both are forms of thinking with assent. This 
differential aspect of his epistemology comes to the fore in the fourth chapter, 
in which he discusses the objects of knowledge. According to Ayers, objects 
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of knowledge are not propositions, but items in the real world, like states of 
affairs, events and material entities.
The second, negative thread in the argument developed in this book is anti-
conceptualism. According to Ayers, almost all of contemporary philosophy of 
perception and epistemology is infected with the virus of conceptualism.
The two threads, the phenomenology of perception and the anti-
conceptualist stance, come together in Ayers’s discussion of the objects of 
knowledge. Faithful to his anti-conceptualism, Ayers defends the view that the 
objects of primary knowledge are states of affairs in reality and not proposi-
tions, as the majority of contemporary epistemologists maintain. He allows 
that beliefs still have, though not in all cases, propositions as their objects. I 
examine this view, in which the objects of knowledge are thus different enti-
ties than the objects of belief, in particular with an eye towards what happens 
when a belief becomes secondary knowledge or primary knowledge.
This discussion serves as a prelude to the presentation of a number 
of problems for Ayers’s epistemology. It turns out that, as a consequence of the 
rejection of conceptualism in perception, perception no longer fits into 
the traditional propositional attitude psychological framework of thinking and 
reasoning. If this is correct, it seems that Ayers has to supplement his theory of 
perception with an alternative philosophy of mind.
1 The Target: Conceptualism and its Advantages
In order to get a clear view of the conceptualist position, that is the target of 
much of the argument in Ayers’s book, it might be helpful to identify it more 
precisely: First, experiences are supposed to have content that can also be the 
content of acts of judging. Second, perceptual experiences are conceived of as 
propositional attitudes towards a conceptual content (see Crane 2009.) This 
view has been widely adopted. Byrne, for instance, writes: “[P]erceiving is very 
much like a traditional propositional attitude, such as believing or intending.” 
(Byrne 2005, 232)
How come so many philosophers have adopted conceptualism as their posi-
tion? One explanation could be that conceptualism meets what Peacocke has 
called ‘the integration challenge’ (Peacocke 1999, 1–2):
We have to reconcile a plausible account of what is involved in the truth 
of statements of a given kind with a credible account of how we can know 
those statements, when we do know them. […] The concept of truth […] 
must fit into an overall account of knowledge in a way that makes it intel-
ligible how we have the knowledge […] that we do have.
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The challenge we are now concerned with is how to account for percep-
tual knowledge. First, any account of knowledge has to say what the relation 
between knowledge and truth is. In doing so, such an account has to address 
the question of what truth is predicated. What is known must be true. So, what 
are the carriers of truth and falsity? Conceptualism returns a clear answer to 
his question: the carriers of truth and falsity are thoughts (propositions).
Second, Frege’s distinction between first understanding and entertain-
ing the proposition/thought and then, at a second stage, affirming or judging 
that the proposition as understood is true seems intuitively plausible. This is, 
perhaps, especially the case when we consider mathematical statements. First, 
we need to understand their meaning, then we can attempt to prove them. 
If we possess a proof of a statement, we are entitled to affirm its truth or fal-
sity. Applied to perception, this model suggests the following: First we need 
to understand what we see, then we can proceed to use the content of that 
perception in a perceptual judgement. If perception involves the employment 
of concepts, there is a close similarity between understanding a statement 
and perception. Third, it has a clear (and demanding) picture of the justifica-
tion of perceptual knowledge. The items that justify perceptual beliefs ought 
to be carriers of truth and falsity, because they are reasons for action. Fourth, 
conceptualism enables a smooth transition from mere belief to certain knowl-
edge. If we accumulate more evidence, what was initially just a belief becomes 
knowledge. Fifth, the conceptualist analysis of judging constitutes the core/
basis of a comprehensive theory of mind, the computational representative 
theory of mind. (Fodor 1975)
2 An Interpretative Intermezzo: the Extent of Ayers’s  
Anti-conceptualism and its Consequences
It has been suggested that Ayers’s account of perceptual knowledge can be 
interpreted along the lines of ‘a recognitional model’. (Roessler 2020, 4) This 
recognitional model “accounts for perceptual knowledge in terms of the exer-
cise of perceptual-recognitional abilities, that are […] abilities to tell, that is, 
come to know, of things that are some way that they are that way from the way 
they appear to one or other of our sense modalities”. (Millar 2019, viii) This 
interpretation is the result of wishful thinking. Ayers is committed to an all-
out anti-conceptualism, as is evident from his criticism of the conceptualist 
McDowell.
Ayers’s first objection against McDowell immediately shows that he does 
not in any way subscribe to a kind of recognitional model. Recognition may 
sometimes affect how things appear to the senses, but does not determine how 
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things appear to the senses. “Two people may see the same thing – a bird, a 
stone, a shape drawn on paper, or a colour – and see it in just the same way, 
although only one of them recognizes it as a cardinal bird, a flint, a rhombus, 
or puce.” (Ayers 2019, 76) The difference between these two subjects is there-
fore not that different conceptual capacities have been exercised at the level 
of perception, but that they describe differently how the thing looks to them. 
(Ayers 2019, 76–77)
The second objection is the familiar one that concepts cannot capture 
the ‘fine grain’ of objects of experience. Ayers generalizes this objection into 
a fundamental claim: “sensory or perceptual content and semantic or con-
ceptual content are incommensurable.” (Ayers 2019, 77) He illustrates this 
incommensurability by comparing the way a picture or a photograph conveys 
information about a scene with the way a description does. These two ways of 
conveying information each possess their own criteria of determinacy that are 
completely different.
These objections to conceptualism show that Ayers does not adhere 
to the recognitional model, because according to that model, as Roessler 
(2020) notes:
[…] you come to know the animal is a tiger because you are able non-
inferentially to tell a tiger when you see one. Telling or recognizing some-
thing is a way of coming to know what sort of thing it is or what features 
or relations it has.
Ayers explicitly denies this: “[N]ot all perceptual ‘knowledge that’, still less all 
perceptual knowledge, involves recognition or classification under a determi-
nate concept.” (Ayers 2019, 106) Ayers is a radical non-conceptualist.1
3 Objects of Knowledge and Belief
In the fourth chapter of Ayers’s book, entitled “Internal and External Objects 
of Cognition”, the two threads, the phenomenology of perception and anti- 
conceptualism, come together. The positive thread culminates in the claim 
that the objects of knowledge are states of affairs or events in reality, which 
implies the victory of the negative thesis that the objects of knowledge are 
1 I emphasize this, as does Roessler (2020), although the phrase ‘non-conceptual’ does not 
occur in Ayers’s book; yet it seems a helpful characterisation of his position.
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not propositions. This is the most radical claim of the book, since it is widely 
assumed that the object of knowledge is a proposition.2
At the outset of his argument, Ayers, therefore, is in the following predica-
ment: if we want to reject the view that the objects of (perceptual) knowledge 
are propositions, we have to provide an alternative account of the role of truth 
in (perceptual) knowledge in order to meet the integration challenge.
Ayers’s route towards an answer to this question takes as its point of depar-
ture a rejection of the customary alignment of knowledge and belief. In the 
conceptualist tradition, these mental states are conceived of as two distinct 
propositional attitudes towards a proposition that can also be the content 
of an assertion. Knowledge, on this view, is a species of belief, namely, those 
beliefs that have contents that are true and justified.
Ayers rejects this assimilation. He also does not endorse the traditional epis-
temology, that stems from Plato, according to which knowledge and belief are 
two distinct mental faculties. Instead, he argues, we should conceive of ‘knowl-
edge’ as primarily a mental state in which we have direct cognitive contact 
with reality. That mental state is completely perspicuous to itself, in the sense 
that it is evident for the subject that she is in this mental state, because she is in 
causal contact with the object the mental state is about. The knowing subject 
thus knows that she knows.
This description fits most closely perception, which therefore is, to use 
Ayers’s phrase, primary knowledge. Ayers follows the tradition in reserving 
this term for knowledge that is “[…] in itself evident and independent from 
extraneous reasons”. (Ayers 2019, 26) From modelling primary knowledge 
on perception Ayers derives a causal principle. In perception we know that 
the object we perceive is also the cause of our experience; likewise, Ayers 
(2019, 96) states:
The principle that the object of knowledge is also a significant cause 
of that knowledge suggests that the object of an ascription of knowledge 
that S is P is the event or state of affairs, S’s being P, rather than either 
the proposition or the fact that S is P, neither of which are ontologically 
satisfactory causes.
2 A notable exception is Hanoch Ben Yami (1997). For the orthodox view, see, for instance, 
Williamson 2000, 21. That there is something odd about the traditional view that the objects 
of knowledge are propositions has already been noted by Prior (1971, 15–16).
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So, from the start of the argument, it is clear what its conclusion will be. 
What are the other arguments that support this conclusion? – First, Ayers 
establishes that ordinary language shows that knowledge and belief have dif-
ferent objects. Knowledge that S is P is knowing ‘to on’. “Knowing is a rela-
tion of the knower to what it is in the world that is known.” (Ayers 2019, 99) 
Second, this knowledge relation is irreducible; just like the mental states of 
love and regret, it cannot exist without something actual being known. Third, 
those who maintain that in perception the fundamental phenomenon is that 
of seeing that such and such is the case are misled by language. In particular, 
they project the description of what is seen onto what is seen. (Ayers 2019, 113)
Ayers then rejects both propositions and facts as candidates for being the 
object of knowledge, mainly on the basis of the causal principle. They are 
too abstract to be able to play any kind of causal role in acts of perception. 
Propositions are furthermore disqualified, because they are also too abstract 
to be evidence for any judgement about the world. For instance, when we 
want to establish that an accused is guilty, it is, duly considered, her actions 
themselves that make the accused guilty, rather than the descriptions of these 
actions. (Ayers 2019, 117)
Facts are, similarly, too abstract, because they are individuated by the prop-
ositions that describe them. They are, thereby “infected by the timelessness 
or ‘eternity’ of propositions.” (Ayers 2019, 123) The conclusion does not come 
as a surprise: “Particular events and states of affairs are therefore significantly 
better candidates for being what in the world we have in the end ‘latched 
onto’ or apprehended when we have [primary] knowledge of the world.” 
(Ayers 2019, 124)
Besides the cognitive mental state of primary knowledge, Ayers also recog-
nizes a second cognitive mental state, which he calls ‘secondary knowledge’: 
things that are known on the basis of extraneous reasons. Between the two 
kinds of knowledge, there is a hierarchy: “[…] no one could have beliefs, and 
certainly no justified beliefs, if they had no knowledge, no one could have sec-
ondary knowledge unless they had some primary knowledge.” (Ayers 2019, 36)
Ayers’s account of knowledge thus has the following structure: Central 
is the mental state of primary knowledge, of which perceptual knowledge is 
the paradigm. Primary knowledge of abstract principles is explained in terms 
of perceptual knowledge.3 Whereas primary knowledge is direct, secondary 
knowledge is indirect, in the sense that it is indirectly derived via routes as 
diverse as testimony and inference to the best explanation. Then there is a 
third mental state, belief.
3 I return to this issue below.
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This account raises the question of how to distinguish in more detail 
than just by appealing to ‘extraneous reasons’, first, primary knowledge from 
secondary knowledge, second, primary knowledge from beliefs, and third, sec-
ondary knowledge from beliefs.
3.1 Primary Knowledge versus Secondary Knowledge
What distinguishes primary knowledge from secondary knowledge? Perceptual 
knowledge serves as the paradigm of primary knowledge. A subject has direct 
cognitive contact with his or her environment and perceives him or herself 
as having that very knowledge and how that is perceived. (Ayers 2019, 63, 185)
Secondary knowledge is knowledge whose evidence is derived from pri-
mary knowledge. Examples are testimony, instruction, knowledge by causal 
inferences. (Ayers 2019, 26) Ayers provides an example to make clearer what 
he means by the term ‘secondary knowledge’. On the basis of footprints, drop-
pings, a dung that is still warm, and knowledge of the local bears, a subject 
forms the true belief that a bear has recently passed through. Is this knowl-
edge? According to Ayers it is, because the subject knows how she knows. 
“[T]he causal relation between object and knowledge or belief is perspicuous 
to the knower.” (Ayers 2019, 66)
The treatment of the bear-example suggests that the difference between 
primary and secondary knowledge has a counterpart in mathematics, where 
direct proofs are distinguished from indirect proofs. As is well known, intu-
itionists only accept direct proofs of mathematical statements; similarly, Ayers 
only accepts direct cognitive contact and perspicuous awareness as primary 
knowledge.
3.2 Primary Knowledge versus Belief
The difference between primary knowledge and belief is, according to Ayers, 
not a qualitative but a categorical one. Primary knowledge involves direct cog-
nitive contact with reality and is perspicuous. In an ascription of knowledge, 
one ascribes a cognitive and causal relation to an event or a state of affairs in 
reality. In an ascription of belief, one ascribes a cognitive relation to an inten-
tional content, whether that is semantic, experiential or the content of a pic-
ture. (Ayers 2019, 101)
Knowledge and belief, therefore, can overlap and are not the product of dis-
tinct mental faculties. Both knowledge and belief are forms of thinking with 
assent. As it might be said, and as Zeno Vendler has argued for: “You know 
facts, but you believe propositions.” (Vendler, 1972, 82–83) When an ascription 
of knowledge is appropriate, then an ascription of belief is so too. On other 
occasions, only an ascription of belief is appropriate.
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3.3 Secondary Knowledge versus Belief
The distinction between secondary knowledge and belief is more difficult 
to draw. If we examine Ayers’s example of the footprints of the bear again, it 
seems as if we start with a belief or a hypothesis that is formed on the basis 
of perceptual knowledge of the footprints and the droppings. As Ayers (2019, 
65) notes, when we accumulate more evidence, the belief turns into a piece of 
knowledge:
[W]e can see that one general condition of ‘evidence’ is fulfilled in that 
the inference itself charts the actual causal route from the state of affairs 
of which I have inferential knowledge, the recent presence of a bear, to 
the current indications that I now perceive and recognize. To that extent, 
I know how I know.
This suggests that the belief that there has been a bear, which is a propositional 
attitude directed towards a proposition, has been turned into a piece of knowl-
edge that has as its object a fragment of reality, namely the state of affairs that 
there has been a bear.
Now it would be convenient if we could simply say that the objects of 
belief are propositions and the objects of knowledge states of affairs in real-
ity. However, matters are not so straightforward, given Ayers’s broad charac-
terization of belief. We need a heterogeneous account of the objects of beliefs, 
since many of our beliefs concern existing persons or objects, which we need 
to know if we are in a position to form beliefs about them. That is, many of our 
beliefs presuppose knowledge.
We are now in a position to outline the epistemological theory Ayers has 
erected as an alternative to conceptualism. Perceptual knowledge, seeing, 
serves as the fundamental kind of knowledge, primary knowledge. If we pos-
sess primary knowledge, we have direct cognitive contact with reality, and 
this is perspicuous to us, in the sense that we know that we know the object 
perceived and how we know that. The content of experience is intimately 
related to the parts of reality that are presented to us in perception, because 
we are conscious of the fact that these objects are also the causes of what 
we see.
Beliefs are (or can be) directed at propositions, and they tell us more about 
what we think than about the world around us. Some beliefs, however, are, 
just like primary knowledge, world-directed. The term ‘secondary knowledge’ 
Ayers reserves for knowledge that is world-directed, but in which the evidence 
for it has been acquired indirectly, rather than immediately in an act of percep-
tion in which the object of knowledge is being perceived.
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A crucial consequence of this view of epistemology is that ‘knowledge’ gets 
redefined as a cognitive state of a subject. By eliminating concepts from the 
fundamental acts of perception that cognitive state can be referred to as a non-
conceptual state. It is tempting to conceive of that state as an informational 
state. The challenge for epistemological theories of that kind has always been 
to give a convincing account of the connection between these cognitive states 
and the higher-order conceptual states. In the next section, I will formulate 
objections to Ayers’s position that are all motivated by the fear that this transi-
tion of the cognitive state of perception to thinking in propositions is a serious 
problem.
4 Problems for a Non-Conceptualist Phenomenology of Perception
What are the consequences of replacing a conceptualist theory of perception 
by a realist non-conceptualist account of perception for the mainstream phi-
losophy of mind, in which thinking is conceived as the entertaining of prop-
ositional attitudes towards propositions composed out of concepts? Does it 
require a rejection of the entire framework of propositional attitudes towards 
contents or can they cohere? In order to answer that question, I discuss a num-
ber of problems.
4.1 The Transfer Problem
As described above, Ayers employs two notions of knowledge: primary knowl-
edge and secondary knowledge. On a naïve view of knowledge acquisition, a 
subject first forms a belief and then either falsifies or verifies this belief to such 
an extent that it becomes a justified belief that deserves to be called ‘knowl-
edge’. How does Ayers describe this transition?
Let us study, with an eye towards this transition from belief to knowledge, 
his own example of the bear that was presented to make clear how and why 
we acquire secondary knowledge. What is going on in our mind, when we 
make the transitions Ayers envisages? First, we have primary knowledge of 
footprints, droppings, the warmth of the dung. The object of these pieces 
of primary knowledge are states of affairs in reality. On the basis of this evi-
dence, we form the belief that a bear has passed by. Since we do not have a 
causal, cognitive relation with the state of affairs that there is a bear walking 
around, but only with the state of affairs that there are prints and dung, we have 
a belief that refers to the bear via knowledge by description, e.g. ‘the bear that 
made these footprints’. This belief can be turned into secondary knowledge if 
we accumulate more evidence. But now it seems that Roessler’s interpretation 
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of Ayers’s position as coming close to a recognitional model does seem not too 
far off in this case. (Roessler, 2020, 4–6) For the prints and the dung can only 
serve as justifiers, truth-makers, for the secondary knowledge that there is a 
bear if these things are recognized as prints and dung of a bear.
Secondary knowledge can turn into primary knowledge, for instance, in 
Ayers’s example, when we suddenly encounter a bear walking in the gardens. 
Now it cannot be that somehow the thought that there is a bear in the vicin-
ity that was known secondarily is replaced by the perspicuous awareness that 
there is a bear in front of us. There is no sharp separation between the primary 
knowledge that there is a bear and the thought that there is a bear.4
It seems then that whenever secondary knowledge turns into primary 
knowledge, the concepts required for entertaining the thought that is second-
arily known are also involved. This can be denied, of course, if the prints and 
the dung of the bear cause a non-conceptual thought (content) about a bear 
in the vicinity that is the object of secondary knowledge. That object cannot be 
the state of affairs that there is a bear in the vicinity, because there is no direct 
cognitive, causal contact with that state of affairs. Now it could be maintained 
that there is indirect cognitive, causal contact via the prints and the dung of 
the bear, but then it seems inevitable to assign a role to recognitional capaci-
ties, e.g. ‘these are footprints of a bear’, which Ayers rejects. (Ayers 2019, 171)
4.2 Abstract Knowledge
Ayers also applies his account of primary knowledge to a priori knowledge. 
In Ayers 2019, 64, he claims that
we are in immediate cognitive contact with what is understood. The fact 
itself lies open to us, so to speak. We not only know it, but in virtue of the 
way we know it we know how we know it – that is, how we are related 
to it so as to know it. […] There is no ‘causal route’ from abstract fact to 
thinker, but there is the awareness, not only of the fact (whatever such 
facts consist in), but of our understanding it. […] paradigmatic, primary 
understanding is self-consciously understanding.
This quote invites an objection, namely that in the case of more compli-
cated mathematical and logical statements, we first need to understand the 
abstract proposition, and subsequently find out or construct a proof to the 
effect that the proposition is true. As Dummett has emphasized on many occa-
sions: we ought to distinguish knowing the proposition from knowing that 
4 This touches on the debate between Ayers (2004), Ayers (2019, 76–78) and McDowell (2009).
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the proposition is true. It is precisely for this reason that Frege distinguished 
the content stroke from the judgement stroke in his symbolism. It is also an 
important argument to distinguish between Frege’s notion of sense and the 
notion of linguistic meaning, which Frege introduced, among other reasons, 
for being able to account for the progress of mathematical understanding (see 
Burge 1990, 31). In these cases, it is not a possibility to perceive or take in at a 
glance that the necessary fact is true, for the understanding might as yet be 
incomplete.5 It seems difficult, if not impossible, to account for this phenom-
enon without granting that primary knowledge of abstract principles involves 
propositions.
4.3 The KK-principle
In the explanation of why primary knowledge is self-evident, the KK-principle 
plays a crucial role. It is the principle that if you know, you know that you know. 
Interpreted thus, the principle requires a meta-standpoint on the object-level 
of knowledge. The question then arises what the object of knowledge at this 
meta-level is. Discussions of the KK-principle simply take it for granted that it 
is the proposition that is known at the first level. (Das and Salow 2018, Byrne 
2012, Greco 2014, Stalnaker 2015) Ayers, of course, cannot accept that proposi-
tions are the objects of knowledge, not even of meta-knowledge. He describes 
this meta-knowledge as follows (Ayers 2019, 63):
Conscious perceptual knowledge is such that those that have it not only 
have perceptual knowledge of their environment, but also perceptual 
knowledge that and of how they have that knowledge. They have that 
logically second-order knowledge without second-order reflection. They 
have what I have called ‘primary knowledge’, knowledge gained by being 
evidently, self-consciously, in direct cognitive contact with the object of 
the knowledge.
The object of first-order knowledge are states of affairs in reality. But what 
are the objects of the kind of second-order knowledge that is required for 
the KK-principle? Most defenders of the KK-principle argue that there is 
transparency; the thing that is transparent is a proposition. It seems that the 
notion of second-order knowledge confronts Ayers with a dilemma: He either 
accepts this functioning of the KK-principle or he does not. If he does, he 
concedes to conceptualism that concepts are involved in perception after all, 
5 Ayers notes that it is controversial whether the use of the word fact is legitimate here. I would 
object to use the word ‘fact’ in logic and mathematics.
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namely at this second-order level. If he does not, he owes us an account of 
how the KK-principle is functioning; as things stand, we do not have an 
account of the rational linkages between the first-order level of knowledge 
and the second-order level. His suggestion seems to be that there is second-
order kind of perception involved, but more is needed, certainly in the light of 
the controversies surrounding the KK-principle (see, for instance, Williamson 
2000, 114–119).
4.4 The Integration Problem: Phenomenology of Perception  
and the Mind
Any account of perception faces the problem of how to explain the truth of 
perceptual judgements. Another way of stating this has been done above in 
terms of Peacocke’s ‘integration challenge’. Where does truth come in? This 
raises the question of what the carriers of truth and falsity are in perception. 
In the contemporary literature, this question often is formulated as whether 
perceptual experience can provide reasons (see, for instance, Brewer 1999, 
2018; Cunningham 2018). Cunningham (2018) explores the suggestion that the 
notion of reasons employed in perception can be broadened so as to include 
not only propositions but also objects of awareness. He does so to accommo-
date Davidson’s claim that the only justification for a belief can be another 
belief (Davidson 1986). Since perceptual experiences are not beliefs, perceptual 
judgements cannot be justified. His examination can be read as an attempt to 
meet the integration challenge that conceives of the objects of knowledge as 
entities in reality in the way Ayers proposes.
Cunningham calls the claim that objects of awareness can function as rea-
sons for perceptual beliefs the ‘Truth-maker View’. The puzzle Davidson’s slo-
gan encapsulates is generated by the conjunction of four theses (Cunningham 
2018, 257):
– Reasons Priority: perceptual knowledge is belief held in the light of percep-
tual reasons.
– The Doxastic Thesis: believing for a reason requires that one believes the 
proposition which is one’s reason. “Reasons that are out there in one’s envi-
ronment […] cannot be one’s reasons for belief (or action).” (Cunningham 
2018, 258)
– Belief-Independence: experiences are not beliefs.
– The Non-Inferential Thesis: perceptual knowledge is non-inferential.
The puzzle these theses entail is that perception cannot provide reasons 
for action, because perceptual experience is not a belief. One attempt to 
solve the puzzle is conceptualism, that saddles experience with the same 
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content that can be the object of propositional attitudes. The Truth-Maker 
View Cunningham examines is motivated by the desire to meet the puzzle 
while conforming to Reasons Priority, without having to ascribe representa-
tional content to experience.
The main candidates for truth-makers are: states of affairs, events, objects 
and properties. Ayers mentions three of these as objects of primary knowledge 
(he does not mention properties). Each brings along its own problem, in par-
ticular that of providing a plausible ontology for these truth-makers.
Cunningham defends an argument against the entire idea that any of 
these truth-makers can provide reason for perceptual beliefs, the Explanatory 
Exclusion Argument (Cunningham 2018, 267):
(P1) If S believes that p for the reason that R, then S’s belief that p is 
subject to a rationalizing explanation which has R as its explanans.
(P2) The explanantia of rationalizing explanations are truths.
(C) If S believes that p for the reason that R, then R is a truth.
Informally, the conclusion of the argument is that the reasons for which 
one believes that p are always true propositions, understood in the 
Fregean way […].
This is not the place to examine Cunningham’s attempted refutation of the 
claim that any of the truth-maker candidates can meet the requirements this 
argument imposes on them if they are to be reasons for perceptual beliefs. 
Cunningham (2018, 275) plausibly concludes that none of the items (states of 
affairs, events, objects, properties) are finely individuated enough
to count as factors which give how it is from the subject’s own point of 
view so that their reason to believe that O is F is present as a reason to 
believe that [it is] so[.] […] For if the explanans of the […] explanation 
is just a particular or a state of affairs, then it won’t be an element of the 
subject’s point of view which is the appearance of a reason to believe that 
O is F to them, rather than any distinct member of the innumerably large 
set of propositions which are equally accurate ways of thinking about the 
particular or state of affairs in question.
Cunningham’s conclusion is relevant for Ayers’s position, because, as said 
above, the items he considers as potential truth-makers that can be reasons 
for belief are the same items Ayers considers to be the objects of knowledge 
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(with the exception of properties). If Cunningham’s critical analysis is correct, 
it seems, therefore, that Ayers cannot meet the integration challenge.
How fatal is this for Ayers’s epistemology? The answer is radical. Ayers 
rejects the puzzle, not by rejecting the Doxastic Thesis that believing for a 
reason requires that one believes the proposition which either is, or else rep-
resents, one’s reason but by rejecting the first premise. Cunningham writes: 
“The proponent of the Truth-Maker View is committed to Reasons Priority. As 
such, they want to explain why perception yields knowledge by appeal to the 
thought that perception provides reason for belief.” (Cunningham 2018, 278) 
This is precisely what Ayers rejects: to possess perceptual knowledge is not 
giving and having reasons for believing what is believed. (Ayers 2019, 79)6
Given this rejection, we need to ask how Ayers does conceive of the relation-
ship between perception and reason. On that question, Knowing and Seeing 
does not contain an answer. That Ayers does not address this issue has as a 
consequence that it is also unclear how he would meet the integration chal-
lenge. If one attempts to construct one on his behalf, it is difficult to see where 
to start, because the most crucial ingredient for such an account is missing: the 
carriers of truth and falsity. Neither in his exposition of perception nor in his 
theory of knowledge is there an indication of what exactly truth is predicated.
Now it would be a mistake to call this an oversight. Instead, it seems to me 
that Ayers’s book can be seen as an endeavour to reverse the order in which 
constraints are put on either perception or reason. Standard attempts to 
describe the relationship between thought and perception impose constraints 
on perception to fit the deliverances of the senses into an account of thought. 
This approach leads to an assimilation of perception to thinking, as if to per-
ceive is a kind of thought, which Burge has called an ‘hyper-intellectualization’ 
of perception (Burge 2010). If we follow Ayers, we should instead start with 
an account of perception that delivers constraints on an account of reasoning 
and thinking.7 This means that we need to supplement Ayers’s phenomenology 
of perception with a radical empiricist philosophy of mind. Such an account 
might even be non-conceptualist. When criticizing McDowell’s conceptual-
ism for being unable to account for the intelligent behaviour of fish, Ayers 
(2019, 78) writes:
6 My paraphrase is more outspoken than the cautious formulation Ayers employs on this page, 
but I think it is justified by the anti-conceptualist tone of the book.
7 It has been suggested to me that Ayers’s phenomenology inevitably leads to the continental 
tradition in philosophy.
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The action of the individual fish that was filmed carrying clams a sig-
nificant distance to break them open, after considerable effort, against 
a favourite hard coral, or of the particular octopus that found a way to 
escape and confuse predatory sharks by covering itself with shells and 
seaweed, is surely plausibly taken be [sic] evidence of a level of intelli-
gence and ingenuity once routinely denied to such creatures.
As is evident from this quote, Ayers ascribes intelligent thinking to the fish and 
the octopus, although they do not possess concepts. As a result, we need to 
develop an account of non-conceptualist thinking that explains their actions. 
It seems that, if we regard as compelling Ayers’s phenomenology of percep-
tion, we are driven towards the obligation to develop a similar and fitting non-
conceptualist account of human thinking. This is a speculative conclusion, but 
Ayers’s uncompromising anti-conceptualism does not leave us with another 
option. Primary knowledge, Ayers’s style, seems difficult, if not impossible to 
embed in a conceptualist theory of thought.
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